



**Report of Investigation
into the Collision between
Barbados registered
container carrier *HADIS* and
PRC registered dry cargo ship
GUANG BO YUN 328
in Hong Kong waters
on 1 September 2011**



The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Marine Department
Marine Accident Investigation Section

16 May 2013

Purpose of Investigation

This incident is investigated and published in accordance with the Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (Casualty Investigation Code) adopted by IMO Resolution MSC 255(84).

The purpose of this investigation conducted by the Marine Accident Investigation and Shipping Security Policy Branch (MAISSPB) of Marine Department, pursuant to Shipping and Port Control Ordinance CAP. 313, section 59, is to determine the circumstances and the causes of the incident with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and avoiding similar incident in future.

The conclusions drawn in this report aim to identify the different factors contributing to the incident. They are not intended to apportion blame or liability towards any particular organization or individual except so far as necessary to achieve the said purpose.

The MAISSPB has no involvement in any prosecution or disciplinary action that may be taken by the Marine Department resulting from this incident.

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1. Summary

- 1.1 At 0447⁰² local time on 1 September 2011, the Barbados registered container carrier *HADIS* collided with the PRC (the People's Republic of China) registered dry cargo ship *GUANG BO YUN 328* in the fairway junction about 0.5nm (nautical mile) to the southwest of Tsing Yi Island, Hong Kong.
- 1.2 At the time of the accident, the weather was fine with light air. The sea was smooth, and the visibility was about 4nm.
- 1.3 After the collision, *GUANG BO YUN 328* was damaged at the starboard quarter and seawater flooded into the engine compartment. The vessel sank by the stern and finally foundered in about 2 hours. All her six crewmembers boarded the vessel's lifeboat and were rescued by a Marine Police Launch. *HADIS* sustained paint scratches to her starboard bow. Neither pollution nor injuries were reported in the accident.
- 1.4 The investigation revealed the following contributing factors:
 - *GUANG BO YUN 328*, being the give-way vessel in a crossing situation, failed to comply with Rule 15 (Crossing situation) and Rule 16 (Action by give-way vessel) of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGS) for not taking early and substantial action to keep out of the way of *HADIS*.
 - *HADIS*, being a stand-on vessel in a crossing situation, failed to comply with Rule 17 (Action by stand-on vessel) of the COLREGS but altered course to port to avoid collision with *GUANG BO YUN 328* which was also on the port side.

2. Description of the vessels

2.1 *HADIS*

.1 Ship Information

Flag	:	Barbados
Port of Registry	:	Bridgetown
IMO No.	:	9283033
Call Sign	:	8PAB7
Type	:	Container Carrier
Year of Built (Keel Laid)	:	2003
Gross Tonnage	:	27681
Deadweight	:	37894
Length (Overall)	:	221.62 m
Breadth	:	29.8 m
Main Engine	:	1 x Sulzer 7CYL 2 stroke Diesel Engine
Engine Power	:	21560 kW
Service Speed	:	22 knots
Classification Society	:	Germanischer Lloyd
Shipbuilder	:	Aker MTW Werft GMBH Wismar Germany
Registered Owner	:	Galliot Maritime Incorporation (Panama)
Management Company	:	Rahbaran Omid Darya Ship Management Company (Iran)
Operator	:	Hafiz Darya Shipping Co. (Iran)

.2 *HADIS* is a container carrier classed with Germanischer Lloyd. The accommodation and the main machinery space of the vessel were situated aft. The vessel has 5 cellular cargo holds. The maximum container carrying capacity of the vessel is 2724 TEU, with 1112 TEU below deck and 1612 TEU on deck. She is equipped with 3 deck cranes of 45 tonnes SWL. The navigational equipment of the vessel consisted of 1 magnetic compass, 1 gyro compass, 1 auto-pilot system, 1 set of nautical charts and publications, 1 Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver, 2 radars (both with Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA)), 1 Automatic Identification System (AIS), 1 voyage data recorder (VDR), 1 speed log (through water), 1 echo sounder and 3 Very High Frequency (VHF) radiotelephones.

.3 The vessel was manned by a total of 25 crewmembers, including a Master, 3 deck officers, 4 engineers, 3 electrical officers, 12 ratings and 2 deck cadets. The nationality of the majority of crewmembers was Iranian except one AB from Pakistan.

.4 *HADIS* was trading between Middle East, Southeast Asia and China.



Figure 1 – *HADIS*




Figure 2 – Location of accident

2.2 *GUANG BO YUN 328*

.1 Ship Information

Flag	:	China
Port of Registry	:	Guangzhou
Registration No.	:	090102001557
IMO No.	:	N.A.
Call Sign	:	N.A.
Type	:	Dry cargo ship
Trading Area	:	River trade, the Pearl River area
Year of Built	:	2000
Gross Tonnage	:	435
Length (Overall)	:	42.00 m
Breadth	:	9.50 m
Main Engine	:	2 x Diesel Engine
Engine Power (total)	:	397 kW
Classification Society	:	N.A.
Shipbuilder	:	Huadu Navigation Co. Shipyard, Huadu, Guangdong, China
Registered Owner	:	Guangdong Barge Shipping Co.
Operator	:	Guangdong Barge Shipping Co.

.2 *GUANG BO YUN 328* was a dry cargo vessel. The accommodation and the machinery space were situated aft with a cargo hold. The navigational equipment consisted of a magnetic compass, a searchlight, three sets of Very High Frequency (VHF) radiotelephone, an “electronic-chart” device and a set of binoculars.

.3 The vessel was manned by six crewmembers which include a Master, a Chief Officer, a Third Officer, a Chief Engineer, a sailor and a business operator. All the crewmembers were Chinese living in the mainland.

.4 *GUANG BO YUN 328* was engaged in trade within river-trade areas between Taiping-Dongguan, China and Hong Kong.



Figure 3a – *GUANG BO YUN 328* sank by the stern and slightly listed to starboard after the collision, and finally foundered in about 2 hours.



Figure 3b – *GUANG BO YUN 328* secured alongside a berth after being salvaged and temporarily repaired.

3. Sources of Information

- 3.1 The Master, the Chief Officer, the duty AB, the Pilot and the Co-pilot of *HADIS*.
- 3.2 Data retrieved from the Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) of *HADIS*.
- 3.3 The Master, the Chief Officer and the duty Sailor of *GUANG BO YUN 328*.
- 3.4 The radar records provided by the Hong Kong Marine Department Vessel Traffic Centre.
- 3.5 The Hong Kong Observatory.

4. Outline of Events

All times are local (UTC+8)

4.1 Account of *HADIS*

- .1 *HADIS* departed from Ningbo, China for Hong Kong at 0230 on 29 August 2011. The vessel arrived at Hong Kong Ngan Chau Pilot Station at 0400 on 1 September 2011 with a forward draft of 10.08 metres and an after draft of 11.18 metres. A Hong Kong Pilot and a Co-pilot boarded *HADIS* to pilot the vessel transiting Hong Kong from East Lamma Channel to Urmston Road for Chiwan, China.
- .2 The bridge team consisted of the Master, the Chief Officer, the duty AB, the senior deck cadet, the Pilot and the Co-pilot. The Pilot was responsible for advising the Master on the best way to navigate the vessel through the channel while the Co-pilot was tasked to keep a visual lookout during passage and communicate with the various parties. It is a general practice in pilotage that orders are given directly by the pilot to the helmsman unless the Master overrides them.
- .3 On arrival to the bridge, the pilots exchanged information (including the passage plan) with the Master. Then the Pilot gave order to increase the engine speed from dead slow ahead to half ahead and the ship's course setting on 306°T¹. After passing the Magazine Island, the ship's main engine was increased to full ahead giving a harbour manoeuvring speed of about 12.5 knots². When Lamma Patch was abeam to port, the course was set to 328°T which was further adjusted to 338°T when Green Island was abeam to starboard.
- .4 At 0440, the Pilot observed a target i.e. *GUANG BO YUN 328* on the radar bearing 2 points³ on the port bow at a range of 1.8 nm⁴. The target was also visually observed to be a crossing vessel moving from its port side to the starboard side. *HADIS* maintained her course with a heading of about 338°T and a speed of 12.5 knots. By using the electronic bearing line (EBL) and the fixed range rings on the radar, the Pilot estimated that the target would be able to cross ahead at a range of about 0.5 nm. He assessed that a close-quarters situation was developing due to the crossing vessel and other traffic in the vicinity i.e. a container ship on the starboard bow of the vessel. A continuous sound signal from the ship's whistle for about 30 seconds was given to attract the attention of the crossing vessel.

¹ All courses mentioned in the report are Courses Over Ground (COG) unless other specified

² All speeds mentioned in the report are Speed Over Ground (SOG) unless other specified

³ One point = 11.25 degrees

⁴ Nautical mile (1 nm = 1.8520 km)

- .5 In order to allow more room for the target and other traffic in the vicinity to manoeuvre, the Pilot gave an order at 0444 to reduce engine speed to slow ahead, then dead slow ahead and stop. After stopping engine for about 3 to 4 minutes, the target was observed to be crossing ahead at a range of 4 cables. To allow the target to pass ahead as soon as possible, the Pilot ordered to put the helm on ten degrees to port. While the vessel was swinging to port, the Co-Pilot and the Pilot observed that *GUANG BO YUN 328* suddenly altered course to starboard. In an attempt to avoid collision, the Pilot ordered the helm to “midship” and then “hard-to-starboard” while the engine was at dead slow ahead.
- .6 Soon after, the Pilot lost sight of *GUANG BO YUN 328* because of his view was obstructed by the containers stowed on the forward deck. The Pilot then asked the Master to contact the carpenter who was on stand-by forward to check the position of the crossing vessel. No reply was received. At 0447, the bridge team members felt the vessel shuddered and the crossing vessel was sighted about 20 metres away from the starboard bow of *HADIS* without lights. It was suspected that a collision had occurred. The Co-pilot reported the situation to the Vessel Traffic Centre of Hong Kong Marine Department (HKMD). At about 0450, HKMD instructed *HADIS* to proceed to Ma Wan Anchorage for investigation and *HADIS* dropped anchor in the Anchorage at 0506.

4.2 Account of *GUANG BO YUN 328*

- .1 *GUANG BO YUN 328* departed from Taiping-Dongguan, China at about 1400 on 31 August 2011 and arrived at Tuen Mun Anchorage at 2000 the same day. At 0330 on 1 September 2011, the vessel left Tuen Mun Anchorage for discharging its cargo in Chai Wan. The Chief Officer and a Sailor was on watch on the bridge. The Sailor left the bridge to prepare supper after the vessel passed under the Kap Shui Mun Bridge. The Chief Officer was the only person on the bridge responsible for steering the vessel and keeping a proper lookout. At about 0415, the vessel was proceeding in Kap Shui Mun Fairway south of Mawan heading towards the south of Tsing Yi with a speed of about 5 knots. At 0435, a containership i.e. *HADIS* was observed heading north in the Western Fairway.
- .2 The Chief Officer’s initial assessment was that there was sufficient room for *GUANG BO YUN 328* to pass clear ahead of *HADIS*, but he later found out at about 400 to 500 meters away that the vessel could not pass clear of *HADIS*. He then altered course to starboard attempting to give way and pass clear of *HADIS*. At this juncture, *HADIS* was observed to be altering course to port heading towards *GUANG BO YUN 328*. In order to avoid collision, the Chief Officer then altered course to port. Despite the above avoiding actions, the starboard quarter of *GUANG BO YUN 328*

was hit by the starboard bow of *HADIS*.

- .3 Following the collision, the starboard quarter of *GUANG BO YUN 328* was punctured and the engines stopped running shortly after due to the flooding of the engine compartment with seawater. The Master ordered the crewmembers to board the lifeboat, which was located forward, for evacuation. During the course of evacuation, one crewmember was found missing. The missing person was found in the water and recovered by the other crewmembers to the lifeboat. The Master reported the accident to the police by his mobile telephone. Later a Marine Police Launch located the vessel and the lifeboat, and all the crewmembers of the vessel were transferred to the Police Launch.
- .4 Due to the failure of the engine, *GUANG BO YUN 328* drifted southward towards Western Anchorage No. 2. To prevent the vessel from drifting towards the Kau Yi Chau, the Master and a crewmember were conveyed by the Police Launch to board the vessel at Western Anchorage No. 2 to drop the anchors. The vessel finally foundered at 0725 on the same day.

5. Analysis

All times are local (UTC+8)

5.1 Certification and Experience of Personnel

5.1.1 *HADIS*

- .1 The Master of *HADIS* held a valid Certificate of Competency (COC), as Master of a ocean-going ship of 500 gross tonnage or more, issued by the Government of India. He was issued with a “Officer Confirmation of Receipt of Application” (validity up to and including 27 October 2011) by the Barbados Ship’s Registry, which certified that he had applied for the recognition of his Indian COC under the Barbados Maritime administration. He has been serving on board ships as master for about 22 years with the last 5 to 6 years on container carriers under the same management company.
- .2 The watch-keeping officer i.e. the Chief Officer of *HADIS* held a valid Certificate of Competency as Master of a foreign-going ship of 3000 gross tonnage or more, issued by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. An endorsement to recognize his Iranian certificate was issued by the Government of Barbados on 7 July 2011. He has been serving on board ships as chief officer for about 3 years.
- .3 The Pilot on board *HADIS* is qualified to pilot vessels of up to 260 metres in length within Hong Kong waters. He has conducted pilotage service on various types of vessels.
- .4 The Co-pilot on board *HADIS* is qualified to pilot any vessel without restriction in length within Hong Kong waters. He has conducted pilotage service on various types of vessels for many years of pilotage service in Hong Kong.

5.1.2 *GUANG BO YUN 328*

- .1 The Master of *GUANG BO YUN 328* held a valid Certificate of Competency as Class 2 Master issued by the Dongguan Maritime Safety Administration of China, for river trade vessels plying between Guangzhou and Hong Kong. He has been serving as Master/Chief Officer on river trade vessels for about 5 years.
- .2 The navigation watch-keeping officer i.e. the Chief Officer of *GUANG BO YUN 328* held a valid Certificate of Competency as Class 2 Master issued by the Dongguan Maritime Safety Administration of China, for river trade vessels plying between Guangzhou and Hong Kong. He has been serving as Master/Chief Officer on river trade vessels for about 2 years.

5.2 Certification of the vessels

- .1 The statutory trading certificates of *HADIS* and *GUANG BO YUN 328* were valid and in order.

5.3 Weather, visibility and tidal stream conditions

- .1 According to the Hong Kong Observatory, the weather was fine with light air. The sea was smooth and the visibility was about 4nm. The tidal stream was about 2 knots setting in a south-southwesterly direction.

5.4 Actions taken by *HADIS* (Figure 4)

- .1 A Pilot and a Co-Pilot boarded *HADIS* near the pilot station at about 0400 on 1 September 2011. When these pilots arrived at the bridge, the Pilot gave order to increase the engine speed gradually from dead slow ahead to full ahead, and the vessel proceeded northwards along East Lamma Channel and Western Fairway.
- .2 According to the radar plot and AIS information from VTC, *HADIS* was heading 336°T with a speed of 12.6 knots when the Pilot observed the target i.e. *GUANG BO YUN 328* on the radar bearing 327°T at a range of 1.8nm at 0440.
- .3 The VDR record of *HADIS* indicated that the following engine and helm orders were given by the Pilot before the collision:

<u>Time</u>	<u>Ship's Heading</u>	<u>Speed(Knot)</u>	<u>Engine order</u>	<u>Helm order</u>
0444 ₀₇	338°T	12.3	Half ahead	
0444 ₄₉	340°T	12.2	Slow ahead	
0445 ₀₇	340°T	11.9		Port 10
0445 ₄₀	336°T	11.3	Dead slow ahead	
0445 ₄₁	336°T	11.3		Midship
0445 ₄₈	334°T	11.2		Starboard 20
0445 ₄₉	334°T	11.2		Hard to starboard
0445 ₅₃	333°T	11.0	Stop	Midship
0446 ₀₆	331°T	10.8		Hard to starboard
0446 ₁₇	330°T	10.2	Dead slow ahead	
0447 ₀₀	336°T	9.2		Midship
0447 ₀₂	336°T	9.2	Collision with <i>GUANG BO YUN 328</i>	

According to the AIS information, the heading of *HADIS* swung to port from 339°T at 0445₃₂ to 330°T at 0446₁₇. Then the ship's head swung to starboard from 330°T at 0446₃₂ to 336°T at 0447₀₂ when the collision took place. The speed of the vessel was reduced from 12.3 knots to 9.2 knots when the first order was given by the Pilot to reduce the ship's speed at 0444₀₇ to the time the vessel collided with *GUANG BO*

YUN 328 at 0447₀₂.

- .4 In accordance with Rule 15 of the COLREGS, when two power-driven vessels are crossing, the vessel which has the other on her starboard side shall keep out of the way to avoid collision. In this case, *GUANG BO YUN 328* was the give-way vessel as it had *HADIS* on her starboard side. Although the Pilot estimated that *GUANG BO YUN 328* was going to cross closely ahead of *HADIS*, he made a small alteration of the ship's course to port in order to allow the crossing vessel to pass clear ahead as soon as possible. Rule 17 of the COLREGS requires a stand-on vessel to take action too when it is apparent that the vessel required to give way is not taking appropriate action.
- .5 The Pilot gave an order to alter course to port after observing that *GUANG BO YUN 328* intended to cross ahead of *HADIS* because a course alteration to starboard could take the ship too close to another vessel i.e. *BLUE PEAK* which lied to the forward of her starboard beam on an almost parallel course at a range of about 0.23nm from the vessel. He probably acted in accordance with Rule 17(c) which stated that when a stand-on vessel takes action, it may alter course to port if the circumstances permit. In normal circumstances, this is not considered to be safe manoeuvre because the give way vessel may alter course to starboard to go round the stern of the stand-on vessel at the last minute when the navigation watch-keeping officer on the give way sees that his vessel cannot pass ahead of the stand-on vessel. In this case, *HADIS* without knowing the maneuvering intention of *GUANG BO YUN 328*, the two vessels end up in a more dangerous situation when the stand-on vessel alters course to port and ends up in the path of the give-way vessel. In this connection, *HADIS* is not complying with Rule 17(c) of the COLREGS. Probably the best option for *HADIS* was to take early avoiding action by reducing the ship's engine speed to a stop and/or even going astern. Had this action been taken, *GUANG BO YUN 328* would probably pass clear of *HADIS*. According to the VTC radar plot in *Figure 4* and *HADIS*'s VDR record, when the Pilot gave order to reduce the engine speed from full ahead to half ahead at 0444₀₇, *GUANG BO YUN 328* was on a bearing of 330° and at a range of 0.76nm (about 1405m) from *HADIS*. At 0445₅₃, when the order to stop engine was given, *GUANG BO YUN 328* was on a bearing of 333° and at a range of only 0.27nm (about 491m) from *HADIS* which was still making a speed of 11 knots. The order of "stop engine" given at 0445₅₃ was only 1 minute 46 seconds after the first order to reduce the engine speed was given at 0444₀₇. It is considered that the action to slow down or stop the vessel should be taken earlier in order to avoid the close-quarters situation and/or the collision.
- .6 *HADIS* sounded three prolonged blasts on the whistle during the period from 0446₁₅ to 0446₃₇ i.e. about 47 seconds before the collision with *GUANG BO YUN 328*. This was a last-minute attempt to attract the latter vessel's attention and prompt her to

take avoiding action. At this juncture, *GUANG BO YUN 328* was on a bearing of 331° and at a range of only 0.167nm (310 metres) from *HADIS*. In accordance with Rule 34(d) of the COLREGS, *HADIS* should have sounded at least five short and rapid blasts on the whistle at an earlier stage when she failed to understand the intentions or actions of *GUANG BO YUN 328*.

5.5 Actions taken by *GUANG BO YUN 328* (Figure 4)

- .1 In this incident, *GUANG BO YUN 328* was the give-way vessel as she was crossing from the port side to the starboard side of *HADIS*. Initially the vessel tried to cross ahead of *HADIS* but having assessed that there was insufficient room to pass ahead of *HADIS*, the navigation watch-keeping officer i.e. the Chief Officer altered the ship's course to starboard with an intention to go round the stern of *HADIS*. About 46 seconds before the collision with *HADIS*, the Chief Officer altered the ship's course to port intending to keep the stern of his vessel clear from the bow of *HADIS* which was observed to be altering course to port.
- .2 The extract of the target information of *GUANG BO YUN 328*, as recorded in the Vessel Traffic Services Management System of HKMD, indicated that the following movements of the vessel before the collision:

<u>Time</u>	<u>Course (COG)</u>	<u>Speed (SOG) in knots</u>
0442 ₀₅	127°T	5.5
0445 ₂₀	111°T	4.5
0446 ₂₆	179°T	4.5
0447 ₀₂	150°T	5.0
Collision with <i>HADIS</i>		

- .3 Referring to the target information above and the VTC radar plot of *GUANG BO YUN 328* in Figure 4, the vessel proceeded along the Kap Shui Mun Fairway with a course of 127°T and a speed of 5.5 knots at 0442₀₅. Between 0442₀₅ and 0445₂₀, the vessel altered course to port slowly from 127°T to 111°T. At 0445₂₀ the vessel altered course to starboard from 111°T to 179°T at 0446₂₆. The vessel then altered course to port from 179°T at 0446₂₆ to 150°T at 0447₀₂ when the vessel's starboard quarter was struck by *HADIS*. The speed of the vessel was between 4.5 and 5 knots throughout the passage.
- .4 Rule 15 of the COLREGS stipulates that in a crossing situation, the give-way vessel shall avoid crossing ahead of the other vessel if the circumstances permit. Rule 16 further requires that the give-way vessel shall take early and substantial action to keep well clear. In this incident, *GUANG BO YUN 328* being the give-way vessel failed to comply with the requirement to take early and substantial action to keep clear of *HADIS*.




Figure 4 - Radar Plot showing the Collision Tracks of HADIS and GUAN BO YUN 328

5.6 Equipment and engine failure

- .1 There was no evidence to indicate that there was any malfunctioning of equipment on both vessels throughout the incident.

5.7 Alcohol and Drug

- .1 There was no evidence to indicate that the bridge personnel on both vessels including the two pilots had been affected by alcohol or drug.

5.8 Fatigue

- .1 There was no evidence to indicate that the bridge personnel on both vessels including the two pilots had suffered from fatigue.

5.9 The Time and the Position of the Collision

- .1 According to the radar tracks of *HADIS* and *GUANG BO YUN 328* provided by the Vessel Traffic Centre of Hong Kong Marine Department, the collision occurred at 0447₀₂ on 1 September 2011 at Lat. 22° 19.3' N and Long. 114° 05.1' E in the fairway junction about 0.5nm to the southwest of Tsing Yi Island, Hong Kong.

5.10 Damage to the Vessels and Casualties subsequent to the Collision

- .1 At 0447₀₂ on 1 September 2011, the starboard bow of *HADIS* collided with the starboard quarter of *GUANG BO YUN 328*. At the time of the collision, *HADIS* was on a course of about 323.4°T (COG) with heading 336°G and at a speed of about 9.2 knots (SOG) while *GUANG BO YUN 328* was on a course of about 150°T (COG) and at a speed of about 5 knots (SOG).
- .2 The collision damaged the starboard quarter of *GUANG BO YUN 328* and the side shell of the engine compartment of the vessel was pierced causing it to be flooded by seawater. The vessel sank by the stern with a slight list to starboard and managed to remain afloat but was drifting southward towards Western Anchorage No. 2. All six crewmembers managed to board the vessel's lifeboat and were subsequently located and rescued by a Marine Police Launch. The vessel finally foundered in the waters in the Western Anchorage No. 2 in about 2 hours at 0725 the same day. (AD/MP: There was no indication that the vessel sank further. It is noticed that the depth of water in WA2 is shallower. This may explain why 328 foundered in WA2.)
- .3 *HADIS* sustained only a few paint scratches to her starboard bow.
- .4 Neither pollution nor injuries were reported in the accident.

6. Conclusions

- 6.1 At 0447⁰² local time on 1 September 2011, the Barbados registered container carrier *HADIS* collided with the PRC registered dry cargo ship *GUANG BO YUN 328* at Lat. 22° 19.3' N and Long. 114° 05.1' E in the fairway junction about 0.5nm to the southwest of Tsing Yi Island, Hong Kong.
- 6.2 Weather and visibility, conditions of navigational equipment and main engines, alcohol, drug and fatigue issues are not attributing factors to the accident.
- 6.3 The bow of *HADIS* collided with the starboard quarter of *GUANG BO YUN 328*. The side shell of the engine compartment of *GUANG BO YUN 328* was damaged and the compartment was flooded with seawater. The vessel sank by the stern with a slight list to starboard and drifted slowly towards the Western Anchorage No. 2. It finally floundered in the Western Anchorage No. 2 in about 2 hours after the collision. All her six crewmembers managed to board their lifeboat and were rescued by a Marine Police Launch. *HADIS* sustained paint scratches to her starboard bow. Neither pollution nor injuries were reported in the accident.
- 6.4 The investigation revealed the following contributing factors:
- *GUANG BO YUN 328*, being the give-way vessel in a crossing situation, failed to comply with Rule 15 (Crossing situation) and Rule 16 (Action by give-way vessel) of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 (COLREGS). It did not take early and substantial action to keep out of the way of *HADIS*.
 - *HADIS*, being a stand-on vessel in a crossing situation, failed to comply with Rule 17 (Action by stand-on vessel) of the COLREGS by altering course to port to avoid collision with *GUANG BO YUN 328* which was on her own port side in the crossing situation.

7. Recommendations

- 7.1 A copy of the report should be sent to the following parties informing them of the findings in this accident:
- the owner/management company, the Master and the Chief Officer and the flag Administration (Barbados Maritime Ship Registry) of *HADIS*;
 - the owner/management company, the Master and the Chief Officer and the flag Administration (Guangdong Maritime Safety Administration of the People's Republic of China) of *GUANG BO YUN 328*;
 - the Hong Kong Pilotage Association Limited, the Pilot and the Co-pilot of *HADIS*; and
 - the Pilotage Unit of the Port Control Division of the Hong Kong Marine Department.
- 7.2 The respective owner/management company of *HADIS* and *GUANG BO YUN 328* is recommended to issue notice/circular to draw the attention of their Masters and officers to the findings in this report and ensure that COLREGS should be strictly complied with at all times whilst navigating their vessels.
- 7.3 The Hong Kong Pilotage Association Limited is recommended to issue notice/circular to draw the attention of their pilots and co-pilots to the findings in this report and ensure that COLREGS should be strictly observed at all times whilst piloting vessels.

8. Submissions

- 8.1 In the event that the conduct of any person or organization is commented in a marine safety investigation report, it is the policy of Hong Kong Marine Department to send a copy of the draft report, either in part or entirety, to that person or organization for their comments.
- 8.2 The draft of the safety investigation report was sent to the following parties:
- the owner/management company, the Master and the Chief Officer of *HADIS*;
 - the Hong Kong Pilotage Association Limited, the Pilot and the Co-pilot of *HADIS*; and
 - the owner/management company, the Master and Chief Officer of *GUANG BO YUN 328*.
- 8.3 The draft of the safety investigation report was also sent to the following substantially interested States in pursuant to the Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident for their comments:
- Barbados Maritime Ship Registry, the flag Administration of *Hadis*; and
 - Guangdong Maritime Safety Administration of the People's Republic of China, the flag Administration of *GUANG BO YUN 328*.
- 8.4 The draft of the safety investigation report was sent to the Pilotage Unit of the Port Control Division of the Hong Kong Marine Department for comments.
- 8.5 Comments were received from the parties of *Hadis* i.e. the Master, pilot and PNI of *Hadis*, also comments were received from Hong Kong Pilotage Association Limited, no comment was received from the flag Administrations of both vessels and parties of *GUANG BO YUN 328*. The draft of the safety investigation report was made some minor amendments with considering the comments received.

